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In a previous paper Hayden and I proved, using the Heisenberg picture, 
that quantum physics satisfies Einstein’s criterion of locality. Wallace and 
Timpson have argued that certain transformations of the Heisenberg-
picture description of a quantum system must be regarded as leaving 
invariant the factual situation being described, and that taking this into 
account reveals that Einstein’s criterion is violated after all. Here I 
vindicate the proof and explain some misconceptions that have led to this 
and other criticisms of it. 
1. The proof 
Einstein’s (1949) criterion for locality is that for any two spatially separated 
physical systems  S1  and  S2 , ‘the real factual situation of the system  S2  is 
independent of what is done with the system  S1 ’. A previous paper (Deutsch & 
Hayden (2000)) included a proof that quantum physics satisfies this criterion. The 
method was first to prove that every quantum computational network satisfies it, 
and then to infer the same for general quantum systems by appealing to the 
universality of such networks2. For convenience I summarise the proof here: 
Consider a quantum computational network  N  containing n qubits Q1,… ,Qn . In 
the Heisenberg picture, each qubit Qa at time t can be described by a triple  
                                                
1 To be published by Proc. R. Soc. A. 
2 Despite the discreteness of the observables of qubits, this universality includes the ability to 
simulate systems with nominally continuous degrees of freedom. That is because the existence of 
the Bekenstein bound (1981) implies that the state space of any quantum system of finite volume 
has finite dimension. For a quantum-field-theoretic version of our proof that does not rely on the 
Bekenstein bound, see Rubin (2002, 2011). 
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Choose, as the computation basis at time t, the simultaneous eigenstates 
 z1 ,…,zn ; t  of the observables 
 ˆ z a t( ) = 12 ˆ 1 ! ˆ q az t( )( ) . (3) 
So  zˆa t( )  is the projector for the a’th qubit to hold the value 1 at time t.  
The effect of a gate G acting on k qubits between times t and t+1 is  
 
 ˆ
qaG t +1( ) =UG
† qˆ1G t( ) ,…, qˆkG t( )( )qˆaG t( )UG qˆ1G t( ) ,…, qˆkG t( )( ) , (4) 
where  1G ,…kG  are the indices of the qubits that are acted upon by G, and  aG  is 
any such index. All observables of other qubits are unaffected by G. The form of 
each UG qua function of its arguments is fixed and characteristic of the 
corresponding gate G. Its form qua unitary transformation varies accordingly. 
Conversely, given the form of all the  qˆa t +1( )  as functions of the  qˆa t( ) , one can 
infer what gates are present during that computational step and which qubits 
pass through which gate. In other words, the dynamics – the laws of motion – of 
the qubits of the network are encoded in the histories of their Heisenberg 
observables.  
For present purposes we lose no generality by assuming that the Heisenberg state 
of the qubits of  N  is  0 , the zero-eigenvalue eigenstate of all the  zˆa 0( ) . For if we 
wanted to study an arbitrary network  !N  in some other Heisenberg state, say 
! , we could do so by prepending to  !N  a network  !!N  that has the same 
number of qubits and effects a unitary transformation mapping  0  to !  (such a 
network must exist because of universality) and is in its Heisenberg state  0 . That 
means that the combined network  N  would also be in the state  0 , and  !!N  
would prepare  !N  in the Schrödinger state !  at the time when  !N  begins to 
compute, which is the same as preparing it in its Heisenberg state ! . A proof 
that the combined network in state  0  satisfies Einstein’s criterion is then also a 
proof that  !N  in state !  does. Consequently we can confine attention to 
networks in state  0 , and we can adopt the compact notation  !Aˆ t( )" # 0 Aˆ t( ) 0  
for the expectation values of observables. 
Rather than engage with the complication of modelling the relevant properties of 
spacetime, such as the finiteness of the speed of light, we prove a stronger result 
than strictly required, replacing ‘spatially separated’ in Einstein’s criterion by 
‘mutually isolated’. Qubits  Qa  and  Qb  are mutually isolated during a particular 
computational step starting at time  t1  if (though not necessarily only if) they are 
not passing through the same gate during that step.  Qb  then remains isolated 
from  Qa  at least until it enters a gate with any qubit which, at some time after  t1 , 
was not isolated from  Qa . 
‘Anything done with’ the qubits of a sub-network  N1  means any locally-caused 
effect on them. We build that into our model by considering networks  N !( )  
containing one or more parameterised gates in a sub-network  N1 !( ) . The 
parameters symbolised by θ are deemed to be set by an external agent, such as an 
experimenter trying to cause a violation of Einstein’s criterion. Any preparation 
supposedly needed to cause a later violation is represented by a sub-network  !!N  
acting before  N1 !( )  begins. (Modelling a system in a state other than  0  is 
formally the same as modelling such a preparation.) Einstein’s criterion then 
becomes: Let  N1 !( )  and another sub-network  N2  of  N !( )  be mutually isolated 
during at least the period when the gates parameterised by θ act. Then, for as long 
as they remain mutually isolated, the factual situation of the qubits of  N2  cannot 
depend on θ. 
 
Fig. 1: Einstein’s criterion 
Since the state  0  and the prepended network  !!N  contain no information about 
θ, and since the dynamics of each gate are encoded in the change in the 
observables of the qubits on which that gate acts, the full factual situation of any 
sub-network of the network is specified by the observables of that sub-network 
alone. And since the observables change only inside gates, Einstein’s criterion is 
necessarily satisfied by every quantum computational network, and hence by all 
quantum systems. 
2. The density operator 
In classical physics, the complete description of a physical system can be 
separated into a kinematical part, which consists at each instant of a set of real 
numbers that are in principle measurable (such as particle positions or field 
values), and a dynamical part, which consists of a rule (such as a differential 
equation) stating how the kinematical part changes with time. An important 
departure from this in quantum physics is that observations do not generally have 
quantum observables as outcomes, despite the name. Instead, the connection 
between theory and experiment is via the observables’ expectation values – itself a 
somewhat misleading term since it suggests that observables are stochastic 
variables (see Section 9). Similarly, there is a potential ambiguity when we speak 
of ‘measuring the value’ of an observable, for there are two quite different things 
that the term ‘value’ might refer to. One is the observable’s Hermitian-operator 
value. The other is a real number – an outcome of a measurement of the 
observable.  
In the Heisenberg picture, observables are functions of time just as in classical 
physics; but unlike in classical physics they specify both kinematics and 
dynamics. Expectation values are given by a fixed linear function,  !i" , from 
observables to real numbers. In the Schrödinger picture, kinematics and dynamics 
are separate, as in classical physics, but unlike in classical physics the kinematical 
part does not consist of the observables (which never change), but of density 
operators, which specify the changing expectation values of observables. Every 
quantum system or subsystem  S  has a density operator  !ˆS t( ) , which has the 
property  Tr !ˆS t( )Aˆ = "Aˆ t( )#  for any observable  Aˆ t( )  of  S , where  Aˆ ! Aˆ 0( )  is the 
Schrödinger-picture form of the observable. For example, the density operator of 
Qa at time t is  !ˆa t
( ) = 1Tr1ˆ 1ˆ+ qˆai 0( ) qˆai t( )i"( ) . 
3. Wallace and Timpson’s critique 
Given a network  N  in state  0 , consider any unitary-operator-valued function of 
time  V t( )  such that for some real function  ! t( ) ,  
  V t( ) 0 = ei! t
( ) 0 . (5) 
Then define 
   ˆ!qai t( ) = V
† t( ) qˆai t( )V t( ) . (6)  
Since every observable  Aˆ t( )  of  N  is some algebraic function of the  qˆai t( ) , (5) 
makes all expectation values  !Aˆ t( )"  invariant under the replacements 
 qˆa t( )! ˆ "qa t( ) . Hence Wallace and Timpson claim that ‘nothing whatever – no 
observable data, no theoretical considerations – can tell us that the physical state 
is given by [the  qˆa t( ) ] rather than [the  ˆ !qa t( ) ]’. They draw an analogy with gauge 
transformations in classical electrodynamics, where no experiment can detect 
whether the vector potential is  Aµ x( )  or  !Aµ x( ) = Aµ x( ) + "µ# x( ) , where x 
represents position in spacetime and  ! x( )  is an arbitrary scalar field. Just as we 
regard all vector potentials related by such transformations as describing 
physically the same electromagnetic field, so, they argue, we must regard any two 
Heisenberg-picture descriptions that are related by a Wallace–Timpson 
transformation as referring to the same factual situation.  
It would then follow that the full factual situation of a quantum system  S  is 
represented by the density operator of the combined system of  S  and everything 
it is entangled with. Only part of that information, namely the density operator of 
 S  itself, is ‘independent of what is done’ to other systems isolated from  S . The 
rest, which exists if and only if  S  is entangled with another system  !S , can 
depend on what is done to  !S  even when it is spatially separated from  S . That is 
the origin of the historical claim that entangled quantum systems violate 
Einstein’s criterion. And so Wallace and Timpson conclude that ‘we are again left 
with a theory whose states are non-local’. 
4. The meaning of Wallace–Timpson transformations 
What, in the Heisenberg-picture description, does the Wallace–Timpson 
identification rule deny is part of the factual situation of a quantum system? 
Consider a two-qubit network whose density operator  !ˆ t( )  evolves as follows, 
expressed in terms of eigenstates of the  zˆa 0( ) : 
  !ˆ 0( ) = 0,0 0,0 ; !ˆ 1( ) = 1,0 1,0 ; !ˆ 2( ) = 1,1 1,1 .  (7) 
Since the states in (7) are pure, it must, according to the Wallace–Timpson 
identification, be a complete description of the factual situation of both qubits. 
That would mean that the infinity of networks that could cause this evolution 
would all give rise to the same factual situation of the qubits over time. Here are 
two such networks: 
 N : 
 
  !N : 
 
Fig. 2: Two networks related by a Wallace–Timpson transformation 
(The horizontal arrow represents a controlled-not gate and ‘~’ labels a not gate.) 
Since a not gate effects the unitary transformation  qˆax t( )  on Qa and a controlled-not 
gate (with Qa as the control and  Qb  as the target) effects a different 
transformation  
1
2 lˆ + qˆbx t( ) + qˆaz t( ) ! qˆaz t( ) qˆbx t( )( ) , the Heisenberg-picture 
descriptions of the qubits in the two networks are different:  
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where all the observables on the right-hand sides of the equations are evaluated at 
 t = 0  and the parameters ‘(0)’ have been suppressed for brevity. A Wallace–
Timpson transformation relating those two descriptions is 
  V 0
( ) = 1ˆ; V 1( ) = 1ˆ; V 2( ) = 12 1ˆ+ qˆ1z + qˆ2x ! qˆ1zqˆ2x( ) . (9) 
Thus, the elements of reality whose existence the Wallace–Timpson identification 
rule denies are the different dynamics of quantum systems – their different laws of 
motion, or in the network model, their different gates. Let me note in passing 
what a bizarre world-view would be forced on us by this rule. For instance, it 
would imply that a sufficiently detailed three-dimensional recording of a person, 
when played, would be a person: a Wallace–Timpson transformation, just like (9) 
only more complicated, relates the two, so the rule calls them factually identical 
situations. More generally, banishing laws of motion from the realm of physical 
reality means declaring that reality consists only of what happens and not why, 
which in turn means banishing almost all explanation from science. But in the 
event, we shall see that (7) is an incomplete representation of what happens, so 
this philosophical issue does not arise.  
Returning now to the issue of Einstein’s criterion, consider: are  Q1  and  Q2  in Fig. 
2 mutually isolated during the period  1 < t < 2? In network  N  they are not, since 
 Q2 , the target of the controlled-not operation, changes its stored value from 0 to 1 
only because  Q1  holds a 1 during that period. But in network  !N  they are 
isolated, since each is acted upon by its own single-qubit gate independently of 
the other. Similarly, does the factual situation of  Q2  at  t = 2  ‘depend on what was 
done’ to  Q1  during the period  0 < t < 1  (namely that its value was flipped from 0 
to 1)? Again, the answer is different for  N  and  !N . Therefore, according to the 
Wallace–Timpson identification, there is no factual difference between these two 
qubits being isolated or interacting, nor between one of them being affected or 
unaffected by what is done to the other – nor, therefore, between satisfying and 
violating Einstein’s criterion. 
Nor is that just a peculiarity of those particular networks. For any network  N , 
consider any two descriptions related by a Wallace–Timpson transformation. The 
laws of motion for the  ˆ !qa t( )  are different from those for the  qˆa t( ) . Instead of (4), 
they are, for each k-qubit gate G of  N , 
 ˆ
!qaG t +1( ) = V
† t +1( )V t( )UG† ( ˆ !q1G t( ),…, ˆ !qkG t( )) ˆ !qaG t( )UG( ˆ !q1G t( ),…, ˆ !qkG t( ))V† t( )V t +1( ) . (10) 
For generic choices of  V t( ) , (10) does not describe a k-qubit gate. It acts non-
trivially on all n qubits of  !N  because the factor  V† t +1( )V t( ) , expressed in terms 
of the primed observables  ˆ!qai t( ) , generically depends on all 3n of them. The same 
holds for all the other gates acting during the same period, and therefore, since a 
particular qubit can be in only one gate during any computational step, the 
primed observables can describe a network with not only different gates but 
different topologies (how the gates are connected and how many qubits each acts 
on) and hence different locality structures (which qubits are mutually isolated). 
Generically they describe networks in which only a single gate acts at a time, on 
all n primed qubits simultaneously, so that even if  N  models a system consisting 
of several mutually isolated subsystems,  !N  models one in which every qubit 
affects every other during every computational step. 
Hence, the Wallace–Timpson identification rule would compel us to regard the 
distinctions drawn by Einstein’s criterion as not referring to anything real. That, 
and not a violation of the criterion as such, is the content of Wallace and 
Timpson’s conclusion that ‘quantum physics has non-local states’.  
Nevertheless, what about their argument that their identification must be made, 
because the two descriptions result in identical predictions, just as two different 
gauges do in electrodynamics?  
5. Experimental tests in quantum physics 
A statement, such as  !Aˆ t( )" = k , assigning a value to a symbol in a scientific 
theory, constitutes a prediction only if the theory (or some associated theory) also 
describes a physical procedure for testing that prediction. That description is the 
operational meaning of the prediction.  
Let me stress immediately that I am not claiming that the operational meaning is 
the only content of a scientific theory (or equivalently that two theories necessarily 
describe the same reality if they make identical predictions). That would be 
positivism, which is a catastrophic philosophical error (see Deutsch 2011). But that 
philosophical issue need not detain us here, because I shall now show that it is not 
the case that two theories related by a Wallace–Timpson transformation make 
identical predictions.  
At a given time  t1  the density operator  !ˆS t1( )  summarises all predictions of 
expectation values  !Aˆ t1( )"  of observables  Aˆ t1( )  of  S  at time  t1 . The procedure for 
testing a prediction  !Aˆ t1( )" = k  includes measuring  Aˆ t1( )  instantaneously at time 
 t1  on many identically prepared instances of  S , using instruments not initially 
entangled with any of those instances. Here ‘instantaneously’ means rapidly 
compared with the timescale on which  S  would change in the absence of a 
measurement. Then one calculates whether the mean value of the outcomes 
differs significantly from k.  
However, after one has performed a measurement on one of those instances of  S , 
one can wait until a later time  t2  and then perform another. The expectation value 
of the second outcome cannot in general be calculated from the originally-
calculated  !ˆS t2( )  alone, because the first measurement process is itself an 
interaction that changes the density operator from what it would have been in the 
absence of that measurement. 
In the network model, we can represent this broader class of experiments by 
including extra qubits (to hold the outcomes of measurements) and interposing 
extra gates between the gates of a network (to represent the measurement 
interactions). All such measurements are therefore already included in the general 
scheme described in Section 1, of considering parameterised sub-networks  N1 !( ) . 
By including, in the set of networks accessible by varying θ, arbitrary 
measurement gates before and after any particular gate (for example at times 1 
and 2 in each network in Fig. 2), with ancillary qubits to store the outcomes of 
those measurements, and by running  N !( ) repeatedly for various values of θ, one 
can model experiments that determine the dynamics of the gate to any desired 
accuracy. Hence they also determine the operator values of all the observables in 
terms of what they were at  t = 0  (in other words, the complete operator algebra 
can be determined), and in this way all the information in the Heisenberg-picture 
representation can be tested by experiment. 
So it is not true that ‘nothing whatever – no observable data, no theoretical 
considerations – can tell us’ whether the factual situation is given by the original 
theory or the transformed one. Those two cases can be straightforwardly 
distinguished by the very equipment needed to measure the expectation values – 
which the Wallace–Timpson identification says represent the only elements of 
reality. This is not the case with the classical electromagnetic vector potential: no 
classical equipment could measure it. So whether or not it makes sense to regard 
it as representing an element of reality3, in quantum theory there is no option but 
to do so for the Heisenberg observables. 
Logically, that completes the vindication of the Deutsch–Hayden proof. But there 
are some explanatory loose ends, which I shall address in the remaining sections. 
6. A new quantum-theoretic picture? 
Nothing in the above argument depends on adopting the Heisenberg picture. It is 
convenient to do so, since it displays the flow of information in quantum systems 
so explicitly; but the fact that the Heisenberg observables contain information that 
is not contained in any of the density operators, but does describe the reality of a 
quantum system, can be deduced in the Schrödinger picture as well. All the above 
arguments can be straightforwardly translated into the Schrödinger picture: one 
begins by defining operator-valued variables equal to the Heisenberg-picture 
observables of each qubit; then one proves that in the networks used in the proof, 
those variables can be affected only by local interactions of that qubit, but contain 
all the information in the Schrödinger state; then one proceeds as in Section 1. 
                                                
3 Whether the quantum-mechanical Aharonov-Bohm effect forces us to regard the vector potential 
as an element of reality too is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Some authors (e.g. Vedral & Horsman 2006) have described our method of using 
a standard Heisenberg state  0  as a new quantum-theoretic picture, or at least as 
a variant of the Heisenberg picture. Timpson (2005) even considers it a new 
theory purporting to replace quantum theory. But in fact we are using a standard 
Heisenberg picture and merely confining attention to networks that are in state  0 . 
Such networks suffice to prove our result because, as I pointed out in Section 1, 
any network in an arbitrary Heisenberg state !  can be regarded as a sub-
network of one in state  0 , and if any network satisfies Einstein’s criterion then 
so does every sub-network of it. Hence we are neither making any assumption 
nor losing any generality. We are working in a standard Heisenberg picture, 
equivalent to the Schrödinger picture in every way except for the inconvenience 
of the latter for analysing information flow.  
7. Wallace–Timpson transformations and operational meanings 
Under a transformation of variables in a physical theory, operational meanings do 
not in general transform trivially. For example, if  x1 t( ) ,…,xn t( )  are the positions of 
n Newtonian billiard balls, then the operational meaning of  x1 t( ) = k  might 
include something like: ‘put a detector at the position k at time t, and observe 
whether it fires’. But if we then define 
  
 
!xi t( ) = Vij t( )xj t( )
j
"  (11) 
for some time-dependent invertible matrix  Vi
j t( ) , there is no way to test whether 
 !x1 t( ) = k  merely by putting a measuring instrument at a particular place. It 
involves something like quickly searching the whole of the available space for the 
balls – or perhaps searching for  n !1  of them and then placing a detector at the 
predicted position of the remaining, m’th ball:  k ! " i#mVm
i t( )xi t( )( ) Vmm t( ) .  
If we transform all the operational meanings in that way when we transform the 
variables, the transformed theory describes the same factual situation as the 
original. In particular, if it happened to be more convenient in some situations to 
use the primed variables (for instance, the position of the centre of mass is such a 
variable), then one could use the primed theory to prove that the unprimed 
variables describe localised objects and then that the system satisfies Einstein’s 
criterion, just as one can use the Schrödinger picture to prove that quantum 
theory does. So I shall call that the content-preserving transformation. It is not what 
Wallace and Timpson use. They use what I shall call the formal transformation of 
operational meanings: simply taking the operational meanings from the original 
theory and putting a prime on each unprimed observable. So the resulting theory 
says that the  !xi t( ) , and not necessarily the  xi t( ) , are the positions of billiard balls. 
That does not, in general, describe the same factual situation.  
But, say Wallace and Timpson, sometimes it does – specifically, when the 
transformed theory predicts the same values for all the transformed variables as 
the original theory did for the original variables. So, to complete the analogy 
between (11) and the Wallace–Timpson transformation (6), let us choose  Vi
j t( )  
such that the  xi t( )  constitute a unit-eigenvalue eigenvector of it. Then  !xi t( ) = xi t( )  
for all t, and so all three theories – the original one and the transformed ones 
under both the content-preserving and the formal operational meanings – say that 
there is a particle at each  xi t( ) .  
Yet the formally-transformed theory still describes a different physical system 
from the other two. Although its ‘billiard balls’ are moving on the same 
trajectories as the original ones, they are obeying different laws of motion. For 
example, suppose that the balls in the original theory move in straight lines unless 
 xi t
( ) ! xj t( ) = 2r , in which case they bounce specularly. Then in the formally 
transformed theory the primed balls numbered i and j suddenly change course 
whenever 
 
Vi!1 k t( ) !Vj!1 k t( )( ) "xk t( )k# = 2r , a condition that generically depends 
on the positions of all the (primed) balls and could be satisfied even if they were 
nowhere near each other. So their law of motion is, like (10), non-local. As with 
(10), and with the pair of networks in Fig. 2 in particular, that drastic difference 
between the formally transformed theory and the original one is not apparent if 
the balls are set in motion with the specified initial conditions and then left alone, 
because for that situation, the two different laws of motion happen to produce the 
same trajectories. But if we were free to experiment on both systems, and were to 
perturb their corresponding variables  !xi t( )  by the same amounts  ! "xi t( )  such that 
they no longer constituted an eigenvector of  Vi
j t( ) , their respective trajectories 
would in general differ subsequently.  
Given any extended physical system that satisfies Einstein’s criterion, there exist 
descriptions of it in which the equations of motion for some variables depend on 
all the variables. So that property is not a reasonable criterion for non-locality. 
Moreover, it is a property of formalisms but is not meaningful for physical 
systems, while Einstein’s criterion is about physical systems only.  
An important class of operational meanings are the specifications of which 
physical processes constitute measurements, and of what they measure. Everett 
(1957) was among the first to take seriously that measurements are subject to the 
same laws of physics as all other processes and have to be analysed as such in 
order for the resulting theory to be consistent. As Wallace and Timpson rightly 
remark: “in a physical theory we would normally prefer that what is ‘observable’ 
(i.e. the expectation values derived from  0 ) would emerge from a physical 
analysis of measurement, rather than by fiat”. But they themselves do not 
implement this. Doing so would, among other things, entail recognising that 
under their formal transformation of operational meanings, measurement 
interactions do not map to measurement interactions. The networks of Fig. 2, 
related by the Wallace–Timpson transformation (9), are a simple instance of this: 
the last step of  N  constitutes a perfect measurement of  zˆ1 1( ) , while  !N  makes no 
measurement at all. This would make the Wallace–Timpson identification 
impossible even if nothing else did, because two theories that disagree about what 
constitutes a measurement of what, cannot be said to ‘make identical predictions’.  
8. The counterfactual import of Einstein’s criterion  
Einstein’s criterion requires the factual situation of  S2  not to depend on what is 
done to  S1 . Thus it refers to variants of  S1  – systems to which ‘something had 
been done’ that would make them different from  S1  in its actual condition – and 
to what  S2  would or would not do in that counterfactual situation. 
We have seen that the Wallace–Timpson identification erases that distinction 
between dependent and independent, and between mutually isolated and 
interacting, and hence between satisfying Einstein’s criterion or not (erasing the 
latter distinction being the purpose of the identification). Also between local and 
non-local dynamics, and between different dynamical laws that happen to produce 
the same motion in a given instance of a physical system, and between what does 
or does not constitute a measurement of anything, and even between people and 
recordings. All these erased distinctions involve that same counterfactual element. 
And we can add information and causation to the list.  
In the network model, we incorporated such comparisons by means of the 
externally set parameters θ. However, the external agent is itself a physical 
system. If the rebuttal of Wallace and Timpson’s argument depends on analysing 
how a system responds to the actions of an external agent, can it be evaded by 
applying their argument to the combined system including the agent, and 
ultimately to the entire physical world, on which no external agent can act, and of 
which multiple instances cannot be constructed?  
At this point, if we were investigating Einstein’s criterion in classical physics, we 
should have to engage with some awkward philosophical issues about the agent’s 
free will. But again, that is not necessary in quantum physics because it is not 
necessary for the agent to choose !  freely: randomly will do, provided that the 
randomiser is not entangled with  N1  or  N2 . 
So, call the randomiser  N0 . We are now contemplating a non-parameterised, 
isolated network of this form: 
 
Fig. 3: Using a randomiser as the external agent 
where  N0  transforms  0  to a superposition of eigenstates of the  zˆ -observables 
(3) of the control qubits, and  N1  effects a controlled unitary  i ii! "Ui , with the 
control qubits selecting which unitary transformation  Ui  will be performed on the 
remaining qubits of  N1 . The (operator) values of the  zˆ  observables of the control 
qubits remain unchanged. This loses some generality compared with allowing 
 !!N  to be an arbitrary network acting on all the qubits as in Fig. 1, but the 
assumption that there are unentangled systems in the past is inherent in the 
concept of a measurement (see Section 10). The attribute referred to by Einstein as 
‘independent of what is done with’ now means ‘the same in all relative states 
corresponding to different values of the control observables’. Those relative states 
are all eigenstates of the control observables (at both  t1  and  t2 ). And so we 
continue as in Section 5: we investigate what happens to  N2  in each relative state 
with eigenvalue i. We find that it is identical to what would happen if the gate 
acting on  N0  during  0 < t < t1  were replaced by one that transforms  0  to  i  
instead of to a superposition of all the eigenstates. Thus we reach the same 
conclusion as in Section 5. 
Now consider Wallace and Timpson’s argument in such a case. It hinges on their 
(mistaken) claim that the only testable predictions made by quantum theory are 
the expectation values of its observables in one particular state. But in the case of a 
closed quantum system that has no outside, nothing can detect even the 
expectation values of most of its observables and therefore, by Wallace and 
Timpson’s argument, those observables do not exist. 
So it is Wallace and Timpson’s argument, not its rebuttal, that depends on the 
existence of an external agent. 
9. Algebra-valued reality 
It follows from our proof that according to quantum theory, we are all made of 
algebra-stuff4: the elements of local reality are faithfully described not by real 
variables or stochastic real variables but by the elements (inappropriately called 
‘observables’) of a certain algebra that can be represented by Hermitian matrices. 
How it comes about that this algebra-stuff often resolves itself into approximately 
autonomous channels of information flow (‘histories’ or ‘universes’), most of 
which approximately obey stochastic classical laws of motion that associate real-
number values with the observables, is beyond the scope of this paper (but see 
Deutsch (2002), Wallace (2011)). For present purposes what matters is that the 
algebra-stuff often does not behave like that, even approximately, and that it 
especially does not do so in the phenomena of quantum interference and 
entanglement. Under those circumstances, since there are no real-number values 
of observables participating in the phenomenon, the probabilities of observables 
taking such values do not exist. If one tries to insist that they do, by interpreting 
all expectation values in terms of such probabilities, the resulting numbers do not 
obey the probability calculus (see Deutsch et al. 2000). A failure to understand this 
                                                
4 Paraphrase of ‘the Earth and every living thing are made of star stuff’ (Sagan 1980). 
can result in various misconceptions about quantum physics in general, and about 
its locality in particular. 
Historically the most important of these misconceptions has been that Bell’s 
theorem implies that entangled quantum systems violate Einstein’s criterion.  As 
discussed in Deutsch & Hayden (2000), Bell’s theorem is about correlations (joint 
probabilities) of stochastic real variables and therefore does not apply to quantum 
theory, which neither describes stochastic motion nor uses real-valued 
observables.  
The same error was made by Kastner (2011), who criticised the Deutsch–Hayden 
proof on the grounds that in separated entangled systems, Bell-inequality-
violating correlations ‘exist’ before the systems are brought together to be 
compared. But Kastner’s ‘correlations’ are not correlations (probabilities that the 
real-number values of separate observables are equal), because in the given 
entanglement phenomena, the information flow is made of algebra-stuff that is 
not resolving itself into sub-flows each of which is approximately described by 
real-number variables.  
10. Initial conditions and the arrow of time 
The Deutsch–Hayden proof assumes that when the external agent sets the 
parameters θ, this has no advanced (backwards-in-time) effect. In terms of the 
network model, as illustrated in Fig. 1, that means it has no effect on the factual 
situation of the qubits at  t = 0 , nor on the gates and qubits of the sub-network 
 !!N , nor on the timeless Heisenberg state. This causality condition is the usual one 
in measurement theory. A convenient way of modelling it is to require there to be 
no entanglement between different qubits at  t = 0 . That is the content of taking 
the initial state to be an eigenstate of the  zˆa t( ) . Then all entanglement that 
subsequently exists must be created by interactions between qubits. 
It is also possible to model a world in which there was some entanglement at  t = 0  
(at the Big Bang, say). We might be reluctant to model this using a prepended 
network  !!N  as in Section 1, in which case we could use an entangled Heisenberg 
state instead of  0 , and again, our proof would go through unchanged. Timpson 
(2005) argues that in that case, the state would be an element of reality, and a non-
local one: ‘With the global state of the system still playing such an important role 
… it is not clear that we have yet gained much in the way of locality’5. It is true 
that such states – including  0  itself – like the laws of motion, the axioms of 
quantum mechanics, and the global topology of spacetime, are all elements of 
reality that do not have locations, and are ‘non-local’ in that sense – a sense in 
which all theories in physics are ‘non-local’. But they also have in common that 
they cannot be altered. Being universal constants, they are ‘independent of what is 
done to  S1 ’, and therefore their existence does not violate Einstein’s criterion of 
locality. To avoid confusion, they should be called ‘global’, not ‘non-local’. 
For almost any network of gates, some initial states of the qubits would result in 
evolutions which, if interpreted as modelling physical reality as a whole, would 
violate the second law of thermodynamics (with suitable coarse-graining and 
regardless, of course, of which quantum-theoretic picture one uses to describe 
them). Most would not have a consistent measurement arrow of time. Most 
would not include the initially-unentangled systems referred to in the operational 
meanings of observables. Einstein’s criterion is invariant under an overall reversal 
of the measurement arrow of time (since the time-reverse of a quantum network 
is just another quantum network, and one could always append a network  !!!N  to 
make the final state  0 ), but what about more exotic, local changes? For example, 
                                                
5 Timpson makes this comment about what he calls the ‘conservative’ interpretation of the 
formalism, as distinct from the ‘ontological’  interpretation which he considers to be a new theory 
purporting to replace quantum theory, and of which he has other criticisms. But the distinction 
between those interpretations, which depends on the alleged difference in measurability between 
expectation values and operator values of observables, disappears in the light of the comments in 
Section 5 above. 
suppose that in the network  N  of Fig. 2, the measurement arrow of time were 
locally reversed for  Q2  but not for  Q1 . That is to say, the past of  Q2  is affected by 
‘what is done’ to it in the future, rather than vice-versa. Then removing the not 
gate though which  Q1  passes during  0 < t < 1  would change the observables of 
 Q2  at  t = 0 . Yet even then, if one adopts the corresponding definition of ‘for as 
long as they remain mutually isolated’ (not using cosmological time but following 
the worldlines of qubits in the direction of the local arrow of time), Einstein’s 
criterion is still satisfied. 
11. Conclusions 
Wallace and Timpson’s conclusion that there are ‘non-local states’ in quantum 
physics is false. Among other things, their critique depends on the false 
assumption that the only testable predictions made by quantum theory are of 
expectation values of observables in a particular state.  
Einstein’s criterion of locality refers to physical systems, not formalisms, and is 
satisfied by quantum physics regardless of whether it is described in the 
Schrödinger or Heisenberg picture. Our method of proof is just a method of proof, 
not a new quantum-theoretic picture nor a variant of quantum theory. Our 
conclusion that the factual situation of quantum systems is described by their 
Heisenberg-picture observables is an implication, not an assumption, of the proof. 
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